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‘We are all human’: Cosmopolitanism as a radically political, moral project 
Dr. Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, Durham University 
 
When you see these people coming out of the boats, it feels like a thousand eyes are looking at 
you. Their eyes, the eyes of your dead grandparents who were refugees too – who carried the 
identity of the refugee for their entire lives, the eyes of your children, the eyes of the unborn 
who will be reading about these events one day in their history books. A thousand eyes, a 
million eyes, looking at you, asking you: “what are you going to do?” How can I go on with my 
life as if nothing happens  knowing that so many human beings are tortured in this way? The 
sea has a thousand eyes and they all stare at us with a question: “what are you going to do?” 
(Maria, Athens, 2015 original emphasis). 
 
In 2015 and 2016 more than one million refugees, predominantly from Syria, but also from 
Afghanistan and Iraq arrived through Turkey to Greece in flimsy overcrowded boats. The 
precarious journey by sea cost the lives of more than a thousand personsi. Greek people, an 
otherwise predominantly xenophobic and openly nationalist public, demonstrated en masse 
their support to the refugees. The same social actors that conventionally articulate a strong 
resistance to the ideals of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism (cf. Kirtsoglou and 
Theodossopoulos 2010a) manifested their solidarity to the displaced in a variety of 
discursive and practical ways. Ordinary people expressed their identification with the 
‘refugees’ (prosfyges), a term thus far reserved almost exclusively for the Greek-speaking, 
Christian Othodox populations that have been forcibly displaced from Asia-Minor and 
Anatolia as a result of the Greco-Turkish war in 1920-22ii (cf. Hirschon 1989). 
The predicament of the forcibly displaced in 2015-2016 was indeed experienced by many as 
a condition of multitemporality (cf. Knight 2013, 2015; Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2015). 
Refugeeness as collective narrative and transgenerational trauma (cf. Anastasiadis 2012), as 
well as memories of economic migration to Europe, US or Australia became for a large part 
of Greek society mechanisms of substitution (Levinas 1981) through which a number of 
people identified with the displaced.  
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The cultural framework through which this identification was expressed was the concept of 
humanity, as a quality and an ethos that binds all human beings in a universal and timeless 
manner. A careful examination of what it means to be human in Greece and of the ways in 
which intimacy, inclusion, and exclusion are understood and negotiated reveals the 
recognition of our common humanity to be an explicitly political expression of the 
cosmopolitan project. At the heart of the Greek conceptualisation of humanity as a state of 
being we all share, lies empathy as an affirmative political praxis and an affective ethical 
technology. My contribution aims to discuss empathy as a cognitive, experiential and 
affective faculty that is distinct from sympathy, compassion and pity. While I share 
reservations against humanitarian reason and governance, I maintain that hegemonic 
understandings of what it means to be human obscure the importance of local, vernacular 
visions of cosmopolitanism as a moral and yet radically political project.   
What is wrong with emotions?    
Terms such as sympathy, compassion, philanthropy and charity have received considerable 
attention in anthropological literature (cf. Rozaldo 1989; Viveiros de Castro 1992; Throop 
2008; 2010; Bornstein 2009). Different authors have launched pointed critiques against 
compassionate volunteering as the basis of humanitarian ‘anti-politics’ (Tiktin 2011, 2014; 
Fassin 2005, 2007, 2011a, 2011b, Muehlebach 2012; Trundle 2014; Wilson & Brown 2009). 
Emotion-based, spontaneous desire to end the misery and suffering of others (cf. Bornstein 
2009: 632) on the basis of a common humanity (Tickting 2006: 39) is seen as creating a 
hierarchical field of relations at more than one levels. Muehlebach stresses the relationship 
between volunteering and new forms of neoliberal citizenship (2012; cf also Pedwell 2012; 
2014). Fassin highlights the complex ontologies of inequality between humanitarian actors 
and those who receive their assistance (2007). Locked in an aesthetic of eligibility (cf. Cabot 
2014) the sufferer must often prove their innocence through plausible stories and they must 
demonstrate a certain alignment to local ideals (cf. Wilson and Brown 2009: 23; Crowhurst 
2012: 497; Giordano 2008; Ticktin 2006: 43; Cabot 2014; Berlant 2004; Trundle 2014: 144).  
I agree and side with these critiques. Indeed, neoliberal governance literally depends on 
shifting welfare-related responsibilities onto the third sector and ordinary citizens. The 
fragmentary and episodic character of all forms of aid (organised or informal) disputes the 
unquestionable character of basic political and human rights. Ordinary citizens are asked to 
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alleviate the effects of the deep and painful asymmetries created by integrated world 
capitalism (Guattari 2000) in ways that are themselves imbued with asymmetry and 
inequality. Two particular issues however, deserve further attention and discussion. First, 
we need to reflect on perceptions of the role of emotion vis-à-vis our vision of the political. If 
the ‘anti-political’ character of humanitarianism is established in the affective, spontaneous 
responses of actors, what is then the primary principle that organises the ‘political’ field of 
citizenship and equal rights? My aim is not to offer an apology for humanitarianism and 
philanthropy. I can ethnographically ascertain their deeply hierarchical effects. My point 
here is to problematize the manner in which emotion is emerges as hitherto anti-political 
and juxtaposed to a certain –I would say modernist– vision of the political that appears to 
have no legitimate and credible space for the affective and relational components of 
subjectivity. The notion of this rather masculinist understanding of citizenship does much 
more than promote an atomistic and bounded concept of the self (cf. Saba Mahmood 2004: 
12). It creates a paradox, especially relevant in the discussion of forced displacement: 
namely, where is the right to have rights established? (Arendt 1968: 177; cf Benhabib 2004: 
51). For the rights of others to be enforceable norms (i.e., laws), there must be a sovereign 
power with the ultimate authority of enforcement (Benhabib 2004: 29). “The will of the 
democratic sovereign” however, “can extend only over the territory under its jurisdiction; 
democracies require borders. Empires have frontiers, while democracies have borders” 
(ibid: 45). Sovereign bodies, Benhabib rightly observes, depend on this distinction between 
‘full members’ and ‘those who fall under the sovereign’s protection’ (2004: 45). There is 
therefore something inherently paradoxical in regarding nation-states as the guarantors of 
the rights to inclusive forms of citizenship. While I am not arguing in favour of philanthropy 
and charity as a solution to this paradox, I call for a reconsideration of our vision of ‘the 
political’ that seems far too connected to the ideals of a sovereign nation-state bestowed 
with the power to enforce rights and obligations according to a contractarian ethos of 
equality (cf. Kirtsoglou 2006). While I agree that the a-political sentimentality that 
humanitarian sympathy entails is deeply problematic, I claim that we need to find legitimate 
space and role for the shared, affective component within the political.  
The second point that arises from current literature on charity, volunteering and 
philanthropy is our assumptions regarding the meaning of ‘human’. It has been argued that 
belief in ‘our common humanity’ as the origin of our sympathy towards others can be based 
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on a concept of the human that is too general, anonymous, decontextualized and ahistorical 
to be socially and politically meaningful (cf. Malkki 1996). Yet, a closer examination of the 
ethnographic specificity of different works (eg. Muehlebach 2012; Trundle 2014; Ticktin 
2006; Fassin 2007; 2012) reveals that the humanitarian ethos exhibited by the protagonists 
in each case is very much socially, culturally and historically specific. Ideas about who 
qualifies as a ‘human being in need’ are born in a neoliberal context, and remain 
underwritten by an ethos of confession which establishes the ‘truth’ about the Other, her 
innocence, the legitimacy of her suffering and the plausibility of her case. Confession, as the 
main ritualistic (Catholic) technology for the production of truth in the West has been 
established (as Foucault evidences) in the Middle Ages (1978: 58, 59). The deeply 
hierarchical nature of philanthropy, sympathy and compassion is therefore to be found, not 
necessarily in the relationship between giver and receiver per se, but in the fact that 
confession becomes the foundation of such a relation. The ‘gift’ of charity is so poisonous, 
troubling and ambivalent (cf. Derrida 1992; Bornstein 2009; Trundle 2014: 3), because the 
receiver needs –by means of confessing his or her truth- to prove that s/he is human and 
therefore worthy of it. Charity and philanthropy are technologies of (re)humanisation based 
on a notion of the human that needs to be proven, spelt out and justified. In the process of 
becoming knowable, the recipient of charity becomes also governable (cf. Tazzioli 2013; 
Vaughn-Williams 2015). The nature of the relationship that can be established on the basis 
of such a perception of humanity is of course hierarchical. For, the giver always and finally 
establishes herself as the ultimate ‘judge’ of the recipient’s confessed truth.   
In what follows I will investigate Greek conceptualisations of intimacy, inclusion, exclusion, 
hierarchy and obligation. I will eventually show that perceptions of what it means to be 
human form a powerful, vernacular of explicitly political manifestations of solidarity 
mediated by empathy as an affective and transformative technology.  
 
The poetics of sociality: intimacy and common humanity  
Dhikos/xenos 
The distinction between dhikos (one of us, insider, intimate) and xenos (foreign, stranger, 
unknown, outsider) has been discussed in Greek ethnography (cf. Panourgia 1995: 17; 
Danforth 1989: 171; Herzfeld 2003). The distinction between the two terms that are 
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notoriously difficult to translate accurately (cf. Panourgia 1995: 16), for reasons that will 
become evident in the following paragraphs, “demarcates all the boundaries of intimacy 
from a person to a nation [and] provides the framework for moving from one level to the 
other and back again (Herzfeld 2003: 142). In relation to its opposite (dhikos), a xenos can 
mean anyone beyond the kin-group, the neighborhood, a circle of friends, a 
village/town/city/country/ethnos. Dhikos and xenos should be seen not as two clear and 
absolute opposites, which can exist independently of each other, but as a system that 
constitutes intimacy, belonging and proximity, relative, fluid and contextual processes. The 
fellow-supporter of a political party is thus definitely a dhikos in terms of political 
affiliations, but surely a xenos when compared to members of one’s own family. Even within 
the extended family, a distant cousin (otherwise a dhikos vis-à-vis non kin) can be seen as a 
xenos in relation to one’s siblings. To complicate matters even more, the dhikos/xenos 
schema is not just a reference to belonging, but also to emotional attachment and/or trust. A 
person who is a xenos is not only distant, but also –by virtue of being unknown– potentially 
(although not necessarily) hostile and thus mistrusted. In its polysemic character the 
dhikos/xenos identification system creates multiple and sometimes overlapping circles of 
inclusion and exclusion. The many different qualities of proximity, affinity, intimacy and 
distance (genealogical, emotional, political, national, related to trust and mistrust) of 
dhikos/xenos and the fact that unavoidably all individuals occupy several of these categories 
at once, means that one is always at some level a dhikos, and simultaneously (at another 
level) a xenos.  
Apart from being conventionally used as a term of reference for national othersiii, xenos in 
later years, is being deployed (commonly by ordinary people, but also strategically by ultra-
right wing and fascist political circles) as a shorthand for the category ‘immigrant’. Xenos in 
this sense, often acquires racialised connotations and can denote different degrees of 
resentment or even hostility towards foreigners, irrespectively of their legal and political 
status.  
The relative and provisional character of intimacy categories however, means that an 
individual xenos can always become a dhikos (despite the fact that in terms of categorical 
grouping they may remain classed as xenos). The generic category of the stranger/foreigner, 
almost always excludes some particular xenos who is perceived as being ‘different’ (cf. 
Herzfeld 2005: 85). Either through employment, or through neighborliness, or in other 
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contexts, the (foreigner)xenos becomes known (cf. Herzfeld 2003; 2016: 92) and can be 
gradually converted from a stranger into an intimate and trusted figure.  
The transformation of a xenos (in all its different meanings) into a known and trusted dhikos 
happens through sociality that ranges from everyday mundane exchanges to exceptional 
acts of sheep-stealing (cf. Herzfeld 2003: 141). Sociality-induced relatedness is expressed in 
Greek with the term ‘familiarity’ (oikeiotita)iv.  Like dhikos/xenos, familiarity is a provisional 
and performatively established quality. Social exchanges render a person familiar in varying 
degrees and provide the chance to establish trust and loyalty allowing strangers to become 
intimatev.  Two siblings can grow into strangers (xenoi - plural) while complete strangers 
can become ‘close like family’, where family here is to be understood not in its genealogical 
sense, but as a metaphor of intimacy and trust.  
The synthetic and polysemic system of relatedness instituted through the performative 
categories of dhikos/xenos, familiarity, trust and mistrust, is underwritten by equally 
complex processes of creating, accepting and avoiding responsibilities and obligations.  In an 
eloquent discussion of presents and promises and through the examination of name-day gift-
receiving etiquette, Hirschon (2008) explains the politics of obligation. In the Greek cultural 
context where people ‘abhor’ status differences and hierarchical relations “the notion of 
obligation is a nexus which generates ongoing exchanges in which the actors seesaw 
between superior and inferior positions depending at which point in the chain of exchanges 
they are” (ibid: 193). Social actors become trapped in this seesaw as they alternate between 
the positions of gift-giver and gift receiver (2008: 193). The hierarchical relations between 
givers and receivers are at the heart of all patron-client relationships (cf. Campbell 1964), 
regulate the provision and acceptance of hospitality (cf. Herzfeld 2012; Candea 2012), and 
generally pervade all aspects of everyday sociality (cf. Papataxiarhis 1991). As Hirschon 
observes, obligation literally means in Greek to be “under debt”, and Greeks visibly detest 
being indebted and in relations permeated by a sense of obligation (1992; 2008: 193). 
Obligation –as the visible sign of dependency– is indeed a worrisome social burden, but one 
that comes as part and parcel of sociality. The burden of indebtedness is alleviated by the 
responsibility to reciprocate which is an opportunity to find oneself from the position of the 
receiver to that of a giver. Because responsibility implies obligation (and vice-versa), 
ultimately neither condition is comfortable. For, the superiority established through giving is 
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fleeting, provisional and self-subversive, insofar as the moment of giving prefigures the 
moment of receiving.  
Obligation and responsibility become particularly interesting technologies of sociality when 
examined vis-à-vis dhikos/xenos, trust, intimacy, emotional proximity and familiarity. One 
way of transforming a xenos, from a distant outsider to a more intimate insider (dhikos) is 
through initiating cycles of reciprocity that operate as spaces for exhibiting loyalty which 
gradually dissolves feelings of mistrust. The seesaw of obligation and responsibility (cf. 
Hirschon 2008) is thus a way of ‘knowing’ the Other and of creating intimacy, which has the 
power of eroding indebtedness. Within a family –as the primary metaphor for social and 
genealogical relatedness– indebtedness between individuals is ideally absent as members 
are ex officio obliged to cater to the each other’s needs.  
At this point, and before I proceed to examine another important category that mediates 
relations of inclusion, exclusion, intimacy, trust and hierarchy, I must say that the 
aforementioned cultural analysis of dhikos/xenos, obligation and responsibility is not a rigid 
and predictable structural schema. On the contrary, it is filled with ambiguity, 
misunderstandings, ambivalence (even hyperbole) and it is perpetually caught in the politics 
of successful and failed social performance (cf. Herzfeld 1985; Kirtsoglou 2004). The 
inchoate quality of intimacy anticipates its own subversion. Intimacy and relatedness, in 
their performative character, contain within them the seeds of their own negation.  
 
Anthropos 
The term ‘human’ is used in Greek far more often than it is used in English, in the place of the 
generic English word ‘man’, to mean a human being and a person . ‘The man needs his 
privacy’ is translated, for instance, as “the human needs his privacy” (o anthropos thelei tin 
isihia tou).  “Have you got someone to take care of you?” translates in Greek as “have you got 
a human?” (exeis anthropo?), and a common expression for ‘being alone’ is “I don’t even have 
a single human” (den eho oute enan anthropo). To ask someone ‘what sort of human are you’ 
(ti soi anthropos eisai) directly questions their moral ground, while wondering “aren’t I a 
human?” (ego den eimai anthropos?) is a rhetorical way of ascertaining  one’s rights in a 
social context.  
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A ‘human being’, beyond having their basic needs covered, is seen as deserving respect, fair 
treatment, being considered and taken into account. To be a ‘human’, anthropos, means to 
belong to a category of existence by ‘birthright’ (cf. Rapport 2012) and as a matter of 
ontology. It follows that everyone –both dhikos and xenos – is a human being. Humans are 
conceived in Greek culture as sharing a number of common predicaments and a fundamental 
bond, with each other as they endure the difficulties of life as struggle (agonas) (cf. 
Theodossopoulos 2008).  
Human beings are known and defined by their humanity (anthropia), which stands for all 
emotions, habits, attitudes and behaviours appropriate for and towards human persons. 
Much like all other qualities, humanity in the Greek context is performatively established. To 
be a human (anthropos) and to have humanity (anthropia) means to be willing to see the 
world from the Other’s point of view, to engage others in their capacity as human beings and 
not as members of any other category (including gender, race, religion or nationality).  
To relate to others as humans, also means to consciously and significantly play down the 
hierarchies associated with giving and receiving. All human beings are seen as being by 
default vulnerable and therefore potentially in need. This is encapsulated in the common, 
almost stereotypical phrase “we are all human. Today it is you, tomorrow [in the future] it 
will be mevi”. Reciprocity, as the element that alleviates and subverts the burden of 
obligations, is taken in such cases for granted within the time-frame of human kind, a kind of 
timeless, primal time within which we all end up owing to each other and being collectively 
indebted to the supernatural (represented as God, Life or the Universe).  
The opposite –refusing to transcend the level of categorical groupings or to inappropriately 
enforce hierarchical relations of indebtedness– can earn someone the accusation of not 
being human (dhen eisai anthropos esy). While success or failure to honour one’s obligations 
within the dhikos/xenos system is sanctioned at the level of society (koinonia, kosmos cf. Just 
2000), failure to respond properly to other human beings is ultimately judged by the 
supernatural (cf. Herzfeld 2005: 160-170). In more than one occasions during the 2015-
2016 refugee arrivals, and particularly upon hearing about shipwrecks or dramatic landings, 
I have heard different Greek people (not necessarily religious) exclaiming that “God will 
burn us to the ground”, or “God will punish us” (tha mas kapsei o Theos, tha mas timorisei o 
Theos), or simply that ‘we will pay for these things’ (tha plirosoume gia auta ta pragmata). 
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‘Us’ and ‘we’ referred in this case to the human collectivity, to ‘mankind’ which failed so 
dramatically to uphold its primary responsibility of protecting all of its members.   
The meaning of human (anthropos) and of being imbued with a sense of respect towards 
other humans (anthropia), becomes especially relevant against the Aristotelian distinction 
between zoe and bios as theorised by Hannah Arendt (1959). According to Arendt, zoe is the 
kind of unqualified, bare life which becomes meaningful only when it is transformed to bios, 
social life embedded in the body politic. Developing further Arendt’s thought Agamben 
(1998) discusses homo sacer as a special category of the Roman law, within which a human 
being remains the subject of the law but only in terms of bare life. As homo sacer’s rights as a 
citizen are suspended, his/her bios is reduced to zoe and as a result has no political value; 
her death can thus remain without retribution. Arendt’s and Agamben’s analyses seek to 
theoretically grasp the phenomenon of the Holocaust and subsequently of all concentration 
camps as contexts where political existence is reduced, via a process of violent 
depoliticisation to bare life.  
What it means to be ‘human’ in the Greek context questions this radical distinction between 
zoe and bios (cf. Panourgia 2009: 113), sometimes turning it on its head. Attempts to reduce 
a human being into a homo sacer can have the opposite effect, to trigger that is, a process of 
‘recognition’ of the humanity of the other. This basic level recognition compels social actors 
to redeem a fellow-human from the status of ‘naked existence’ and reinstate her to the 
position of having a bios, thereby granting her the right to a dignified and socially recognized 
life. An idiosyncratic version of cosmopolitanism is thus accomplished, through the refusal to 
sustain the distinction between zoe and bios (cf. Rapport 2012) and through a deep-seated 
belief in their ideal unity. 
According to my Greek informants, ‘everyone deserves to live like a human beingvii’. The 
spectrum of rights credited to every human is wide (and in some ways outside the scope of 
this paper), but amongst the most fundamental ones is the right to sociality and to being 
treated by others with humanity. Humanity in this case fits very much the Kantian 
representation of a moral limit to what one is and is not permitted to do to other humans. 
While for Kant however every person deserves respect independently of their deeds, 
humanity in the Greek case is performatively establised. Greek people tend to feel 
responsible for what they do and for what they let happen to others. Failure to exhibit 
10 
 
humanity can earn someone the characterization of inhuman (apanthropos), or animal 
(zoon) (cf. Herzfeld 2005: 76). Inhumanity or animality stems from failing to acknowledge 
the bundle of rights credited to all human kind. If one goes beyond this point, and starts 
actively hurting others, s/he then transforms into a beast (ktinos), and finally into a monster 
(teras), a freak of nature that emerges out of disobeying the most fundamental rules of the 
cosmosviii.  
What I have tried to accomplish in this section is to demonstrate the complexity and fluidity 
of local systems of intimacy, belonging, hierarchy and obligation. While it is true that acts of 
giving and receiving are generally hierarchical and establish asymmetrical relationships, in 
the Greek context they are also means and ways of assuming responsibility and of 
transforming a distrusted stranger into an intimate insider. At the level of dhikos/xenos, 
every act of giving preempts the act of receiving rendering the ensuing hierarchies 
provisional and self-negating. Intimacy, granted or gained through genealogical and social 
relatedness erodes significantly the sense of indebtedness associated with giving and 
receiving. Even if one is stripped of all social networks of intimacy and trust (as in the case of 
refugees), or when these networks have no power to cast their protective shade onto her (cf. 
Loizos 1975), she still remains a human being who deserves the support and fellowship of 
other human beings around her. The manner in which vulnerability and need are envisaged 
in Greece as common predicaments of all humans destabilizes hierarchical relations 
between givers and receivers through the belief that at a fundamental level we are all 
indebted to each other.  
As much I side with the critics of humanitarianism, charity and compassionate volunteering, 
I claim that hierarchical relations between givers and receivers are not uniformly 
understood and constructed at all contexts. In some cases these relations are envisaged as 
far less rigid and they remain mediated by local understandings of what it means to be 
human, insider/outsider and by culturally informed notions of need, responsibility and 
obligation. References to our common humanity therefore, far from being abstract, general 
and ahistorical, are established in culturally and historically specific ways of understanding 
and enacting what it means to be human.     
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Where is the right to have rights established?  
One of the main issues at heart in the critique launched against the deeply unequal character 
of humanitarian reason (cf. Fassin 2012) is that the receiver depends on the good will of the 
benefactor. This hierarchical relationship precludes the establishment of political rights 
within stable and permanent frameworks and leaves large numbers of people literally at the 
mercy of their fellow human beings, trapped at the receiving end of gifts that “call for no 
counter gift” (ibid: 3). I agree with this observation that calls for careful examination of 
alternatives. If one’s rights are not established in the will (good or not) of other social actors, 
two options remain. These rights are either guaranteed by sovereign nation-states, or, they 
come as part and parcel with one’s humanity (cf. Rapport 2012).  The very existence of 
sovereign nation-states however, depends on borders (cf. Benhabib 2004) and aggressive 
politics of exclusion. When it comes to certain rights (such as those of mobility), the nation-
state is certainly not a suitable guarantor. In this sense I find myself in profound agreement 
with Rapport’s position that “the cosmopolitan project is to know Anyone in terms of a 
universal human nature”, where Anyone is a “human actor who is to be recognized as at 
once universal and individual” (2012: 2). The recognition and respect of each other’s 
common humanity promote a kind of cosmopolitan project that is at once political and 
moral.  
The moral aspect of social relations has been central to a number of Enlightenment scholars 
such as Kant, Hume and Adam Smith. For Kant morality is connected to reason and the 
autonomy of individual agents who enforce moral obligations upon themselves (cf. 
Timmerman 2010). Kant’s thought is useful in our understanding of how and why social 
actors force themselves to obey moral codes even at the absence of witnesses. His decisive 
exclusion of sentiments however, as it becomes apparent in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals makes it difficult to account for the role of the affective component in 
moral social relations (ibid).  
In contrast to Kant, Hume is an explicit anti-rationalist. He maintains that morality cannot be 
derived from reason alone, or from the combination of reasoning knowledge and belief 
(Mackie 1980: 52). The seat of morality is to be found in sentiments. In Hume we also find an 
interesting formulation of ‘sympathy’ –not as compassion or pity- but as an inclination to 
share the feelings of Others (ibid: 5). Hume’s concept of ‘sympathy’ inspires Adam Smith.  In 
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his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) Adam Smith envisages ‘sympathy’ to be the effect of a 
process of mirroring through which we understand how others feel in a given situation.  
Smith’s concept of sympathy opens up a very interesting window in our understanding of 
moral sentiments and of what could possibly motivate us to become each other’s keepers of 
rights. In the previous section and while I discussed Greek conceptualisations of ‘what it 
means to be human’, I have claimed that one of the basic dimensions of humanity is the ideal 
unity between zoe (bare life) and bios (social life) that all human beings are seen as hitherto 
deserving in the Greek context. I have also maintained that profound ruptures in this unity 
tend to trigger the conscious efforts of other social actors who feel compelled to relieve the 
suffering of their fellow humans (cf. Bornstein 2009) restoring them back to sociality. What 
Bornstein calls philanthropy (ibid) is in this case an urge to safeguard a person’s right ‘to live 
like a human being’. The motivation behind this urge appears to be established in our 
capacity to recognise and identify with the feelings of others in a way that transcends (in the 
Greek case) categorical identifications predicated by the scheme of dhikos/xenos. The leap 
from viewing someone as dhikos/xenos (intimate/stranger, or insider/outsider) to engaging 
them simply as human beings is mediated –as I have claimed- by the quality, feeling and 
attitude of humanity (anthropia). As a feeling, humanity (anthropia) depends on empathy, 
the recognition of the position of the other and the ability to imagine oneself as another in 
order to appreciate their current problems and conditions. As a quality, humanity 
(anthropia) is the capacity to recognise ruptures in the fundamental unity between zoe and 
bios and as an attitude, it is the actions one takes in order to repair the aforementioned 
ruptures.   
My use of the term empathy here is similar to the ‘essence’ of Adam Smith’s sympathy. The 
term sympathy however is almost impossible to reclaim due to its close semantic association 
with compassion and pity, largely established in the work of Nietzsche. It is in Nietzsche 
(Human All too Human, Beyond Good and Evil, but more so in Thus Said Zarathustra) where 
we see an understanding of compassion as deeply hierarchical, profoundly self-driven and 
condescending. The Nietzschean term Mitleid (cf. Frazer 2006) inspired a genealogy of 
critiques of compassion, pity and sympathy that marked the meaning of all of these terms in 
an irreversible manner.  
13 
 
As opposed to sympathy, pity and compassion in the Nietzschean sense, empathy needs to 
be understood as a cognitive and affective mechanism related to responsibility and, as 
Levinas claims to accountability (1981/2013). For Levinas, identification with the Other 
holds the Self “hostage” and “accountable for what [she] did not do, accountable for the 
others before the others” (Lingis 2013: xxix).  
Empathy as the feeling that mediates the manifestation of humanity presupposes an 
embodied being who reacts to the face of the Other in a visceral manner (cf. Levinas 
1981/2013: 88, 89). The ideal unity of zoe and bios is then enacted in the human being who 
is at once a body and a person, and can partake in the symbolism and physicality of the 
feelings of Others.  
The ability to empathise with others, in conjunction with the culturally specific 
understanding of vulnerability and need as a common predicament of all human beings (as I 
have already discussed) has tremendous political potential. The idea that weakness, 
vulnerability and need –as much as one tries to avoid them– are associated with human 
existence, challenges perceptions and representations of stable hierarchies of powerful and 
weak persons. The saying today it is you, tomorrow it could be me; we are human beings,  
encapsulates a vernacular understanding of power that is almost Foucauldian in character 
since power is not understood here as something that is acquired or possessed by any one in 
particular, but is rather seen as exercised from ‘innumerable points’ (Foucault 1978: 94). In 
order to better understand the fundamental difference between perceiving subjective 
positions (and thus hierarchies) as stable and viewing them as provisional, unpredictable 
and in a state of flux I will juxtapose two quotations. The first, is from Didier Fassin (2012: 
4):   
“Humanitarian reason governs precarious lives: the lives of the unemployed and the asylum 
seekers, the lives of sick immigrants… threaten and forgotten lives that humanitarian 
government brings into existence by protecting and revealing them. When compassion is 
exercised in the public space, it is therefore always directed from above to below, from the more 
powerful to the weaker…. The concept of precarious lives therefore needs to be taken in the 
strongest sense of its Latin etymology: lives that are not guaranteed but bestowed in answer to 
prayer, or in other words are defined… in the relation to those that have power over them” 
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What follows is an extract from my fieldnotes and refers to the 2015-2016 arrival of 
refugees in Greece:  
More than six thousand people live in the makeshift camp of Piraeus in small, flimsy tents and 
some –very few- in larger UNHCR ones. The few showers and bathrooms are insufficient as the 
weather is getting hotter. Eleni, a woman in her fifties comes every day in the camp; two and 
sometimes three and four times. Each time she takes people back to her house to have a bath 
and do their laundry. Eleni carries big IKEA bags with the dry clothes to the camp, where they 
get emptied and filled back again with more clothes to be washed. Randa [Syrian refugee 
woman] tells me that the smell of clothes, washed in Eleni’s house, remind her of her mother. 
Eleni also talks about her own mother who came as a refugee from Asia Minor in 1922ix. “You 
see?” she contemplates, “this is the fate of human beings” (auti einai h moira ton anthropon). 
Back then, it was my mother, today it is those people and tomorrow… who knows? It could be 
me or my children. How can you stay indifferent to what happens here? How can you go to your 
house and eat, and have a bath and relax when you know that there are human beings forced 
to live in these conditions? Human beings like me and you. I am not rich, but I have a bathroom 
and a washing machine. Life? Fate? God? –name it as you want– allowed me to have a 
bathroom and a washing machine. This is what I have. This is what I share x”.  
From reading these two excerpts, it becomes evident that while Fassin refers to a stable 
hierarchy of lives instituted and sustained by the violence of governance, Eleni does not view 
herself as a powerful benefactor, or as a ‘moral neoliberal’ (cf. Muehlebach 2012). Quite the 
contrary, she views plenty of common political ground between herself and the refugees in 
the makeshift camp.   Their condition is something that can happen to anyone. It follows then 
that Anyone is “a human actor who is to be recongised as at once universal and individual 
(Rapport 2012: 2) capable of practicing “a particular localised life… and yet [one who] 
continually embodies global entitlements and continues to be recongized as bearing 
universal capacities” (ibid: 6). Such ‘entitlements’ and ‘capacities’ may not always be positive 
in the manner that Rapport’s jouissance-imbuded concept of the ‘life project’ entails. More 
often than not in the historically formed Greek consciousness they are not entitlements at 
all, but (similarly global) misfortunes, disasters and calamities that test the (similarly 
universal) capacities of people to endure and survive them.   
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Other minds  
Through the example of Greek perceptions of what it means to be human, I have tried to 
show how culturally nuanced moral visions can destabilise and subvert neoliberal 
sensibilities. All human beings are locally seen as being flimsy, vulnerable, at the mercy of 
wars, famines (cf. Knight 2015), natural disasters and a capricious supernatural that is 
constantly criticised in Greece for looking the other way. While God’s gaze (vlepei o Theos) is 
frequently evoked by Greek people as an admonition against wrong-doing, far too often the 
opposite also holds true. The exclamation “God, can’t you see?” (De vlepeis Thee?) serves to 
remind everyone that God, much like the state (cf.Herzfeld 1992) and every other source of 
power, is in fact indifferent to human suffering.  The quality and ethos of humanity as 
anthropia possessed and exhibited by fellow beings is in many ways the ultimate guarantor 
of one’s rights when all else fails.  
Humanity as anthropia cannot be confused with humanitarian governance, charity, pity or 
compassion. It constitutes a vernacular cosmopolitan ethos that is at once a specific kind of 
morality, a social condition and an orientation (cf. Rapport 2012: 27, 30-31), but also an 
aesthetic, and a radically transformative affective, political technology (ibid: 40-41). One’s 
humanity as anthropia is mediated by her capacity to empathise with the feelings and 
predicaments of others to become mobilised and responsible in the face of the Other. 
Empathy in this case promotes an understanding of the human condition that is at once 
timeless and universal. The tragedies, misfortunes and afflictions suffered by one’s 
grandparents as refugees in the past (for instance), are similar to the ones suffered by 
refugees in the present (cf. Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2015). The calamities of life here 
(whatever this ‘here’ might be) are seen in Greece as essentially similar to the ones suffered 
‘over there’ as human beings are ‘the same everywhere and alwaysxi’.  
The culturally specific belief that we are all ‘fundamentally the same’ in our common 
humanity allows one to empathise with the feelings of others.  Does this mean however, that 
they actually know how other people feel? Does this kind of empathy as affective technology 
and political praxis collapse the Other onto the Self, thereby obliterating the differences 
between them? How is empathy as affective recognition achieved in conditions where the 
difference of the Other can be safeguarded and respected?  
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In order to appreciate what ‘the same’ refers to in the Greek case, we need to remember the 
anxiety and ambivalence that a stranger (xenos) causes. The definitional quality of the 
‘stranger’, ‘outsider’ (and potentially mistrusted) xenos is lack of knowledge about them. 
Knowing someone, in turn, is not a matter of knowing their story (cf. Fassin 2012), or their 
soul (cf. Foucault 1978). As Herzfeld observes “[f]or most Greek villagers, moral evaluations 
are not assessments of innate character –which they deny being able to read even as they try 
to do so– but rather of social inclusion” (2005: 86). The ‘truth’ of or about the other is in 
Greece a kind of unattainable knowledge epitomised in the saying “abyss is the soul of 
human beingsxii”.  Confession, is similarly seen as an unreliable technology for the 
production of truth (cf. Foucault 1978), since Greek people casually urge each other to not 
reveal things in confessionsxiii. Sociality (that gradually transforms a person from a stranger 
into ‘one of us’) is actually the only way of knowing something about others. This is 
especially evident in local beliefs about children and young people who have not yet had the 
time to prove themselves through socialisation. Knowledge about them comes from what 
one knows about their parents and family. The manner in which one’s family and social 
milieu operates as a proxy becomes apparent in the saying: “a shoe from your own place 
even if it is patched/but where you know the craftsman who made it” phrased as an 
admonition against marrying an undecipherable outsider or a non-Greek (cf. Herzfeld 2005: 
87, 232).  
Given that knowledge about the other is always provisional and established in social 
relations, and given than a stranger/outsider/xenos is seen as an impenetrable and obscure 
entity, how can empathy operate and how can Greek people claim that ‘all human beings are 
the same’? The quality of sameness refers here to the consequences of our common 
humanity, rather than to our ‘essence’.  The Other is hitherto different in vary many ways 
that include conventional categorical ascriptions, but also feelings, thoughts and intentions. 
Her membership in the timeless and placeless community of humans however, grants her 
similar strengths and vulnerabilities in the face of adversity, comparable options and a 
certain repertoire of reactions to happy and joyful events. And yet, sameness at the level of 
the consequences of humanity does not fully explain how we can claim to empathise with 
the feelings of Others, given that is virtually impossible to know how others feel. The 
question then remains: does empathy need sameness in order to be accomplished?  
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In a creative reading of the Ode to Man in Sophocle’s tragedy Antigone, Castoriadis (2007) 
observes the paradoxical capacities credited by Sophocles to human beings: Man, Sophocles 
says “has developed language and learned to build cities (353-360; cf. Crane 1989: 106). 
Man is all-resourceful, and although s/he does not know the future, s/he manages to “make 
herself a path through everything”, and s/he “advances toward nothing of what is to come 
without having some resource” (360-61). How do human beings ‘learn’ if no one teaches 
them? Castoriadis asks. How do they manage to carve paths into the unknown, being 
prepared (always having some resource), while not knowing what to prepare for? The 
paradox is solved, Castoriadis argues when we understand the power of human beings to 
self-create and to become autodidacts (2007: 33). Human beings invent through their radical 
power of imagination that is (compare with Rapport 2012) at once individual and collective. 
The “radical imagination”, Castoriadis argues “does not exist only at the level of the 
individual psyche, but also at the social-historical, collective level qua radical imaginary 
(Castoriadis 2007: 372 original emphasis).   
 
Taking my cue from Castoriadis’s analysis, I claim that the possibility to empathise with 
other human beings and to understand their feelings relies on the power of the radical 
imagination. At some fundamental level, we all ‘know each other’, while ‘knowing nothing 
about each other’ and this is possible, because despite our differences we are made of the 
same qualities. My Greek informants who empathised with the predicament of the refugees 
in 2015-2016 and declared their solidarity in discursive and practical forms did not profess 
to ‘know’ the Others. They employed their knowledge of past catastrophes learnt through 
the stories of their own grandparents (cf. Hirschon 1989), their knowledge of what it means 
to be a foreigner and a migrant in Germany, Australia, Belgium or the US, and their socially 
acquired knowledge of what the ethos of humanity as anthropia commands one to do in such 
cases. Using this kind of knowledge as a basis, they went on to become autodidacts in other 
people’s feelings and experiences.  
 
The process of autodidaxis facilitates human-to-human relationships in the absence of 
knowledge about non-intimate Others. The experiential (I can see), cognitive (I can 
understand), and affective (I co-feel) components of empathy, are instituted in an 
autodidactic manner and they make relatedness with strangers possible without forcing the 
Other to become one with the Self. As a transformative technology empathy remains an 
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elusive process that depends on conjectures. We believe we can see, we assume we 
understand and we infer the feelings of Others. The “intersubjective space” is indeed “not 
symmetrical” (Levinas 1987: 84). “Things”, Levinas points out “are never known in their 
totality; an essential character of our perception of them is that of being inadequate” (1995: 
22). The face of the Other can be a mirror that aids processes of recognition, substitution and 
identification, but mirroring is itself nothing but an antanaclasisxiv. In literary theory, 
“antanaclasis” refers to “the repetition of a word with a different meaning in each time” 
(Childers and Hentzi 1995: xiii). Our experiential, cognitive and affective perception of the 
Other is a hermeneutic effort. The intersubjective space of our ‘common humanity’ is filled 
with the asymmetries and asynchronicities of this hermeneutic effort. It is in this sense 
intertextual and allows for misunderstandings, for the existence of different meanings and 
for slight (or bigger) misinterpretations and misconstructions of each other. Human being as 
social actors manage to reach a common-ground without necessarily, fully and finally 
sharing each other’s views, beliefs, perceptions and understandings of each other or of a 
given situation. Our common humanity is possible, not despite, but because of antanaclasis: 
because we are capable of imagining oneself in the position of the Other, while knowing that 
we are still separate entities, entitled to the differences between us.  
 
To be human is a deeply political thing  
 
Rather than being understood as a bounded entity, the self emerges as an assemblage of 
forces, composed through history, culture and relatedness. Not despite cultural specificity, 
but because of it Greek subjects can grant moral recognition to others. Through ideas about 
what it means to be human and what our common humanity compels us to do, Greek people 
appear to be capable of placing oneself in the position of the Other, in the full knowledge that 
each and every one remains a separate entity, entitled to her difference.  
The modern Greek vision of humanity, as an unmediated category of belonging, allows 
actors to supersede all other categories of identification (kinship, gender, race, religion, 
ethnicity) which thus prove to be provisional. The recognition of our common humanity 
gives rise to empathy as a moral sentiment, and initiates spirals of responsibility and 
obligation, through which we attempt to bridge the gap between zoe and bios around us. The 
culturally and historically specific content and form of moral sentiments such as empathy 
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cannot be always and fully appreciated through an analysis of large historical forces such as 
neoliberalism, or through (other, culturally and historically specific models) of confession-
based beneficiary-benefactor relations.  This does not mean, that concerns over what 
constitutes humanitarian reason are not valid, widespread and hegemonically present in 
Greece and around the world. It is the task of Anthropology however (and dare I say of a 
postcolonial Anthropology) to mine for alternative understandings and visions of 
cosmopolitan morality. For, such visions can operate as fields for the development of new, 
grassroots, ‘open ecologies’ of solidarity that will form viable alternatives to humanitarian 
governmentality models.  
‘We are all human’ means in the Greek context that we are all vulnerable, precarious, fleeting 
and provisional and as such, the only thing we ‘owe’ to each other is a break from 
indebtedness and hierarchical, asymmetrical relations of power. In this sense to be human is 
a deeply and explicitly moral and political position, intimately connected to the 
cosmopolitan order.   
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i
 I refer here to the Eastern Mediterranean route (Aegean Sea). Overall, more than 4000 people lost their 
lives trying to cross the Mediterranean in the same period.  
ii
 and the ensuing Treaty of Lausanne that commanded the exchange of populations between Greece and 
Turkey in favour of the ethnic homogenisation of the respective nation-states 
iii The term foreign powers (xenes dynameis) and the role of Americans and Europeans as xenoi  have been 
discussed in detail by Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos (2010b)   
iv Please note that the term oikeiotita is etymologically traced to oikos (house – household)  
v and vice-versa. The absence of social exchange or breaking trust leads to estrangement.   
vi Anthropoi eimaste; simera esy, aurio ego.  
vii Na zei san anthropos 
viii The Nazis for instance are frequently characterists as beasts and when it comes to the Holocaust as 
monsters. The term monster is typically used for perpetrators of especially heinous crimes such as child 
physical or sexual abuse or infanticide.  
ix A large number of Greek people experienced the predicament of the refugees who came in 2015-2016 
as a condition of multitemporality (cf. Knight 2013, 2015; Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2015). Both Piraeus 
and the islands where the present refugees landed are primarily inhabited by the descendants of the 
Greek-speaking, Christian Othodox populations that have been forcibly displaced from Asia-Minor and 
Anatolia as a result of the Greco-Turkish war in 1920-22 and the ensuing Treaty of Lausanne that 
commanded the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in favour of the ethnic 
homogenisation of the respective nation-states (cf. Hirschon 1989). Refugeeness as collective narrative 
and transgenerational trauma (cf. Anastasiadis 2012), as well as memories of economic migration to 
Europe, US or Australia became for a large part of Greek society mechanisms of substitution (Levinas 
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1981) through which a number of people treated the ‘stranger’ as another human being in need, similar 
to the self.  
 
x H zoe, h moira, o Theos? Pes to opos thes, dosane ki eho ena mpanio kai ena plyntirio. Ayta exo, ayta  
xi Oloi oi anthropoi to idio einai, or panta oi anthropoi einai idioi, or ola gia tous anthropous einai.  
xii Avyssos h psyche tou anthropou. 
xiii As epitomised in the saying ‘don’t even tell the priest about this” (min to peis oute tou papa).  
xiv Interestingly antanaclasis literally means in Greek ‘reflection’ (as one’s reflection in the mirror).  
